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Tax Neutrality and Intangible Capital
ABSTRACT
Many studies measure capital stocks and effective tax rates for
different industries, but they consider only tangible assets such as
equipment, structures, inventories, and land. Some of these studies also
have estimated that the welfare cost of tax differencesamong these assets
under prior law is about $10 billion per year or 13 percent of allcorporate
income tax revenue. Since the investment tax credit was available only for
equipment, its repeal raises the effective rate of taxation of equipment
toward that of other assets and virtually eliminates this welfare cost.
However, firms also own intangible assets such as trademarks,
copyrights, patents, a good reputation, or general production expertise.
This paper provides alternative measures of the intangible capital stock,
and it investigates implications for distortions caused by taxes. The
existence of intangible capital markedly alters welfare cost calculations.
Investments in advertising and R&D are expensed, so the effective rate of
tax on these assets is less than that on equipment under prior law. With
large differences between these assets and other tangible assets, we find
that the welfare cost measure under prior law increases to $13 billionper
year. Repeal of the investment credit taxes equipment more like other
tangible assets but less like intangible assets. The welfare cost still
falls, to about $7 billion per year, but it is no longer "virtually
eliminated." With additional sources of intangible capital, credit repeal
could actually increase welfare costs. Finally, however, the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 not only repeals the investment tax credit but reduces ratesas
well. Efficiency always increases in this model because the taxation of
tangible assets is reduced toward that of intangible assets.
Don Fullerton Andrew B. Lyon
Economics Department Bureau of Business and
Rouss Hall Economic Research
University of Virginia University of Maryland
Charlottesville, VA 22901 College Park, MD 20742
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Before the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the investment tax credit was viewed
as favoring equipment-intensive industries such as those in manufacturing.
The standard view was that noninanufacturing industries were disadvantaged by
receiving a relatively low portion of tax credits for equipment. Measured
effective tax rates were often high for nonmanufacturing industries, and a
major focus of tax reform was an attempt to "level the playing field" by
repealing the investment tax credit. Not surprisingly, perhaps, "the
legislation was opposed by the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A., the
National Association of Manufacturers, ...anda long roster of
representatives of corporate America" (Birnbaum and Murray, 1987, p. 161).
However, this standard view ignores intangible capital such as
trademarks, copyrights, patents, or a good reputation. Firms invest in
these assets through advertising, research and development, and other
expenses that create future goodwill and know-how essential for profitable
future production. These expenses are deducted immediately rather than
capitalized and amortized over the life of the intangible asset. Thus
firms' accounting for tax and book incomemay overstate expenses and
understate profits. If so, measured effective tax rates would be overstated
for firms with a relatively intensive use of intangible capital. Many of
these firms had little to lose from repeal of the investment tax credit and
would naturally favor rate reduction: their intangible investments were
already written-off at the earlier high statutory rate and would generate
subsequent income to be taxed at the new low rate. In fact, tax reform was
favored by "such powerhouse companies as General Motors, IBM, and Procter
and Gamble" (Birnbaum and Murray, 1987, p. 161). Later in this paper we-2-
measure intangible capital and find that its ratio to total capital is
highest in transportation equipment and ordnance, second in motor vehicles
(including General Motors), third in finance and insurance, fourth in
chemicals and rubber (including Procter and Gamble), and fifth in machinery
(including IBM).
Mismeasurement extends beyond the "average effective tax rate," or
ratio of taxes paid to capital income. It also affects the "marginal
effective tax rate" which expresses the future tax on a marginal investment
as a fraction of the expected future income. Many studies have calculated
these rates for tangible assets such as equipment, structures, land, and
inventories, but they often omit intangible capital. If the statutory rate
is constant, the marginal effective tax rate is zero on intangible capital
because an immediate deduction for the outlay is equivalent in present value
to exempting from tax all future income generated by the asset.
These marginal effective tax rates are often used to measure the
economic cost of tax distortions and niisallocations. In this paper, we
calculate the "welfare cost", or the dollar cost of production inefficiency,
attributable to tax differences among corporate assets. With only tangible
assets such as equipment, structures, inventories, and land in the corporate
sector, tax differences under the old law create welfare costs of about $10
billion per year, or 13 percent of federal and state corporate tax revenue.
These results accord with existing estimates, where the major distortion is
the low tax on equipment due to investment credits. This welfare cost is
virtually eliminated by a reform that includes repeal of the investment tax
credit.-3-
The existence of intangible capital markedly alters welfare cost
calculations because the effective rate of tax on these assets is even less
than that on equipment under prior law. We provide alternative measures of
the intangible capital stock. With large tax differences between intangible
assets and other assets, using our basic measure of intangible capital, we
find that the welfare cost measure increases from $10 billion to $13 billion
per year. As pointed out by Summers (1987), repeal of the investment credit
taxes equipment more like other tangible assets but less like intangible
assets. The welfare cost still falls, to about $7 billion per year, but it
is no longer "virtually eliminated." Our basic estimate of intangible
capital is constructed by considering only advertising and R&D expenditures.
With additional sources of intangible capital, credit repeal could actually
increase welfare costs.
Finally, we note that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 also reduced the
statutory corporate rate that applies to tangible assets. That is, it does
not just raise the tax on equipment (away from intangibles), it also reduces
the tax on other tangibles (towards intangibles). With our basic measure of
intangible capital, the efficiency cost falls from $13 billion per year
under the old law to $4 billion per year under the new law. No amount of
increase in the stock of intangible capital in this model reverses the
finding that the Tax Reform Act reduces interasset distortions.
This finding does not mean that the new law is perfectly efficient.
There remain tax advantages to investment in advertising, research and
development, and other intangible capital. The subsidy to R&D might be
justified by the existence of "external spillover benefits": the firm may-4-
not receive all of the returns to its discoveries and therefore may not have
sufficient incentive to undertake research. Calculations below show the
efficiency-improving nature of the subsidy in the presence of such an
externality. It is more difficult to justify the advantage to advertising,
however. Calculations with a reduction of this benefit show the greatest
efficiency gain of all.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The first section shows
how average and marginal effective tax rates are affected by the existence
of intangible capital. The second section discusses the nature of
intangible capital and the procedures we use to measure it. Tables show the
relative use of each type of tangible and intangible capital in each
industry. The third section further discusses the tax treatment of tangible
and intangible capital, while specifics of our tax and efficiency cost
calculations are relegated to an appendix. The fourth section reports
results of our efficiency cost calculations, and a final section summarizes
our findings with concluding remarks.
1. Effective Tax Rates and Intangible Capital
Much of the discussion about tax differences revolves around measures
of effective tax rates that take the ratio of taxes paid to capital income
in each industry. This "average" effective tax rate has been used by many
to identify high-taxed and low-taxed sectors of the economy. For other
applications, such as measuring the effect of taxes on investment
incentives, this measure suffers from a number of problems. First, as an
aggregate measure, it cannot distinguish the taxation of income earned from-5-
the various types of assets in which firms invest. Second, it looks
backward at the taxes paid in a given year, rather than forward at the taxes
that would be paid on the future income generated by a new investment under
consideration in that year. Fullerton (1984) describes many reasons that
the two concepts would differ.
For these reasons, many choose to characterize tax differences by the
cost of capital or "marginal" effective tax rate. This rate can be
calculated for each asset, and it compares the present value of taxes
expected to be paid over the life of a given investment with the gross
income expected to be generated. It is a "marginal" effective tax rate
because it is calculated for an investment that is expected to yield a
return just equal to the cost of funds.
Here, however, we would like to emphasize that past measures of both
average and marginal effective tax rates often do not account for intangible
capital and thus mischaracterize tax differences across industries. An
industry that makes extensive use of intangible capital may pay a tax that
is relatively low, even though past reported measures of average or marginal
effective tax rates have been characterized as relatively high.
The key feature of intangible capital is that firms can expense it. In
accordance with generally accepted accounting practices, advertising and R&D
expenses are deducted immediately, for both book and tax purposes. If the
firm is growing, the deduction for current investments in advertising and
R&D is larger than a deduction for economic depreciation of existing-6-
intangible assets. Thus expenses are overstated, profits areunderstated,1
and the ratio of taxes to profits is overstated. This is the mismeasurenient
mentioned above: average effective tax rates may not have been so high in
industries receiving the tax advantages of expensing intangible investments.
Because an immediate deduction for the initial expenditure on
intangible capital is equivalent to exempting the entire income stream from
the investment, the marginal effective tax rate of intangible capital is
zero. If industries differ in their relative use of intangible capital,
comparisons of marginal effective tax rates that excluded the taxation of
intangible capital may be misleading.
An example using actual tax data may help demonstrate the tax advantage
of expensing intangible capital and the mismeasurement of tax rates. In
1983, corporations in the chemical and rubber industry had taxable income
after deductions of $15.9 million.2 The tax liability of this industry
after the use of tax credits was $3.15 million. The ratio of taxes paid to
taxable income is 19.8 percent.
Using data described later in this paper, we calculate that firms in
this industry spent $15.5 million in advertising and R&D in 1983. Taxable
income before the expensing of these intangible investments is therefore
$31.4 million ($15.9 million plus $15.5 million). To measure economic
income, however, firms should be allowed a deduction for the depreciation of
1While the amount of profit is understated, profit rates are likely to be
overstated if capital in the denominator excludes intangible capital.
tax and income data are from the Internal Revenue Service, Statistics
of Income -1983.Corporate Income Tax Returns. The construction of our
data on intangible capital expenditures is described in section 2.-7-
the existing stock of intangible capital. We calculate that total economic
depreciation of advertising and R&D capital in this industry is $13.4
million. Subtracting this amount from the $31.4 million yields taxable
income equal to $18.0 million. Actual taxes paid as a fraction of this
income is 17.5 percent, about 10 percent less than without this correction.
Thus previously reported effective tax rates were overstated.
Finally, if firms in this industry were required to deduct only
economic depreciation of advertising and R&D capital, tax payments at a 46
percent statutory tax rate would have been nearly $1.0 million higher, or
22.9 percent of the restated taxable income. As shown in this example, some
industries may receive a significant tax advantage from the expensing of
these intangible investments.
2. The Measurement of Intangible Capital
Conceptually, the firm's stock of intangible capital includes its
patents, trademarks, copyrights, customer lists, reputation, and any firm-
specificknowledge about technology, marketing, or production. These assets
may be specific to the firm and difficult to sell in the market, but they
are assets nonetheless. They wear out or become obsolete just like other
assets, requiring reinvestment to maintain their stock. While the return to
any particular investment may be uncertain, in the aggregate these
investments must be expected to generate a viable rate of return since they
utilize funds that could have been profitably invested elsewhere.
For many assets, value can be measured using data from market -
transactions,but intangible assets are rarely bought and sold. For total-8-
tangible assets in the national accounts, the Commerce Department and others
measure capital by the "perpetual inventory" method. Starting with a time
series on investment in equipment, for example, and using assumptions about
economic depreciation, this procedure simply starts with the earliest
available year, adds investment, subtracts depreciation, accounts for
inflation, and repeats for successive years up through the most recently
available year.
The sante procedure can be followed for intangible capital, once the
proper investment series and rate of depreciation are established. Time
series data are available for advertising and R&D, but not all of these
expenditures generate future income. Much advertising information is used
by customers immediately, and much research may never pay off. In fact, for
a given firm, expenditures on R&D may bear little relation to intangible
capital: small R&D in one firm may lead to dramatic scientific discoveries,
while much R&D in another firm may not. Firms likely invest in R&D until
the expense is matched by the expected future value of the intangible asset,
however, so the aggregation of many firms in the economy or even within one
industry may provide a good correspondence between R&D expenditures and
subsequent intangible capital.
Some previous research has been directed toward measuring intangible
capital. Much of this literature relates to prior claims that industries
with high rates of return must have entry barriers and monopoly profits.
When measures of intangible capital were added to the denominator of each
industry's rate of return, there was much less variation. Clarkson (1977),
for example, uses time series on advertising and R&D expenses from a sample-9-
of 69 firms representing 11 manufacturing industries. For depreciation, he
cites various studies that "indicate that the economic life ofadvertising
capital ranges from less than one year in one industry to more than ten
years in some ..."(p.41), whereas "estimates of the average life cycle of
a pharmaceutical product, including research and development time,range
from twenty to thirty years" (p. 43). He chooses to assumethree-year
straight line depreciation for advertising; basic research expenditures are
assumed to last for periods of 18 to 21 years, and development expenditures
last for 13 to 16 years. Sensitivity analyses on alternative assumptions do
not substantially affect his major conclusion, namely, that proper
measurement reduces the variation of rates of return among industries.
Grabowski and Mueller (1978) use a questionaire studyconcerning mean R&D
project durations and R&D output lifespans. They assign each of the 86
firms in their sample to one of 9 manufacturing industries and find that "a
depreciation rate of 10 percent would be a plausible starting point for all
of our industries except pharmaceuticals" (p. 334).They cite other studies
showing faster depreciation of advertising, so they use a 30 percent rate of
depreciation for that type of capital.
Our own procedure is as follows. First, we want comprehensivemeasures
of advertising and R&D, not just for some firms or just formanufacturing
industries. We take advertising data from annual issues of the Statistics
of Income Corporate Income Tax Returns, published by the Internal Revenue
Service of the Treasury Department. This source providescorporate
advertising deductions taken by disaggregated manufacturing and noruuanufac--10-
turing industries. From this source, we construct a time series on
corporate advertising investment in each industry for the period1977-l983.
Second, for R&D expenditures, we use annual issues of Research and
Development in Industry, published by the National Science Foundation. We
separate the R&D expenditures in each industry into corporate and
noncorporate components, which we assume to be allocated in proportion to
the tangible capital stock in each sector for each industry. Although the
data are provided with sufficient breakdown among manufacturing industries,
we are forced to allocate a single relatively small figure for the
nonnianufacturing sector among several nonmanufacturing industries using IRS
data on the distribution of R&D credits. At this point, we construct a time
series on corporate R&D in each industry for the period 1963-1983.
Third, to account for each type of intangible capital at the beginning
of the time series, we (a) measure the rate of growth of investment in the
asset in each industry during the time period, (b) assume that prior
investment grew at the same rate, and (c) construct an infinite series for
prior investment.
Finally, we construct a measure of the stock of each intangible asset
as of the end of 1983 in a manner similar to the perpetual inventory method
used by the Commerce Department for tangible capital. Thus the stock for
year-end 1983 includes investment in 1983 with a half year's depreciation
and inflation, 1982 investment with 1.5 years of depreciation and inflation,
3Because of high rates ofdepreciation assumed for advertising, it is not
necessary to collect more years of data. We include constructed estimates
for investment in advertising before 1977, as discussed below, but these
depreciated investments comprise a very small fraction of the 1983 stocks.-11-
and similarly for earlier years. We undertake considerable sensitivity
analysis on annual rates of depreciation. For advertising, we use rates of
one-sixth, one-third, and one-half. For R&D, the rates are .10, .15, and
.20. Our central estimates are one-third for advertising and .15 for R&D.
Measured stocks of intangible capital are shown in Table 1, where the
central depreciation choices imply $165 billion of advertising capital, $305
billion of R&D capital, and $470 billion of total intangible capital. This
total could be as low as $330 billion with the high depreciation assumptions
or as high as $775 billion with the low depreciation assumptions. Under any
assumptions, the largest amount of advertising capital is in wholesale and
retail trade, followed by food and tobacco, metals and machinery, chemicals
and rubber, and finance and insurance. The most R&D is in our large metals
and machinery industry, followed by transportation equipment (including
ordnance), chemicals and rubber (including drugs), and motor vehicles.
More important to each industry, however, is the relative use of
different capital types. Thus we need measures of tangible capital types
used in each industry, and we need to combine several data sources. The
Commerce Department's Survey of Current Business provides equipment and
structures by industry, but not land and inventories. The Federal Reserve
Board's Balance Sheets of the U.S. Economy provides inventories and land,
but only in total. Unpublished data of Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981)
provide each asset by industry, but only for 1977. We therefore adjusted
the 1977 matrix until it matched appropriate totals for 1983. These data
are very similar to the tangible capital data used in earlier efficiency-12-
cost calculations by Gravelle (1982), Auerbach (1983), and Fullerton and
Henderson (1986).
In Table 2, we show the ratio of each type of capital to total capital
in each industry. The most advertising-intensive industry is finance and
insurance, followed by food and tobacco. The trade industry falls in this
relative ranking because it uses large amounts of other assets, particularly
inventories; finance and insurance rises in this ranking because it uses
small amounts of other tangible assets. The most R&D-intensive industry by
far is transportation equipment, followed by motor vehicles. Metals and
machinery had the highest absolute amount of R&D capital, but is third in
this ranking of relative intensity. It is followed by chemicals and rubber.
This measure of intangible capital constitutes about 11 percent of the
total capital stock. With extreme assumptions about depreciation rates,
this figure could almost double. The problem of setting depreciation rates
is modest, however, compared to the problem that advertising (as reported to
the IRS) and R&D expenditures may only account for a small part of total
investment in intangible capital. First, much of what one considers
advertising may be deductible as another allowable business expense. For
example, a company that hires a consultant to mount an advertising campaign
could properly deduct this expense as a consultant fee rather than as
advertising. The costs of consumer relations divisions and sales personnel
are deductible largely as wages. Second, firms may take less direct methods
to create intangible capital. While advertising is one way to create a
reputation, a new firm may sell at lower margins or take greater care in
production or customer service as an alternative way to create intangible-13-
capital.4 Here, foregone profits is the mechanism by which the firm invests
in future reputation. Firms also invest in the future productivity of their
labor force through recruiting and training. Our basic measure of
intangible capital is probably an understatement of the total intangible
capital stock.
There are no appropriate time series data for the amounts of all such
investment, so the perpetual inventory method can never be comprehensive.
In related research, we are investigating alternative methods of measuring
intangible capital. One method would reverse the logic of above-mentioned
attempts to measure variations in the return to properly measured capital:
assume instead an equilibrium where all types of capital must earn the same
net rate of return. For each industry, we can then divide total net income
by the assumed net rate of return to derive the total capital stock, and
subtract estimates of tangible capital to get the implied intangible capital
stock. Problems include measuring capital income, choosing a rate of
return, and accounting for risk differentials.
A second possible method would take the total valuation of capital in
the stock market and subtract tangible capital. Problems here include
transitory influences and correction for taxes. In fact, the market value
of the capital stock divided by its replacement cost is "q", a ratio that is
expected to depend on taxes and to influence investment. It is typically
measured by market value over tangible capital stock, however, a ratio that
41f consumers have full information about thequality of the product, then
extra production costs may not create intangible capital. It may take time,
however, for consumers to recognize quality and recommend the product.-14-
might exceed one if shareholders value intangible capital. Lindenberg and
Ross (1981) found that average q was 1.5 over the period 1960-1977 for a
large sample of firms. If the entire difference between the firms' market
value and the replacement value of their tangible capital stock is
attributable to intangible capital, then intangible capital could be as
large as one-third of the total capital stock. Further, time series
estimates of the effects of taxation on investment using q, such as those in
Summers (1981), could be misleading if intangible investments are not just a
constant fraction of tangible investments used in the estimation. Even more
likely is that intangible capital is not a constant fraction of tangible
capital across industries. Thus estimated q would be expected to differ
among industries for more than tax reasons.
This other work is not complete, but a simple calculation reveals the
possible importance of intangible capital. Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux,, and
Poterba (1983) indicate that net capital income divided by tangible capital
varies between about 3 and 4 percent. If the properly measured net rate of
return were only 2 percent, for example, then the stock of intangibles would
be one-third to one-half of the total capital stock. This is four to eight
times the estimate of intangible capital from the perpetual inventory
method.
As a rough approximation, suppose that this total intangible capital
appears in different industries in proportion to the advertising and R&D
capital estimated above. We can then represent the possibility of greater
intangible capital by simply multiplying the basic estimates by integers-15-
from one to eight, or more. We show how efficiency cost estimatesdepend on
the quantity of intangible capital.
3. Tax Distortions and Efficiency Costs
To measure the efficiency cost of tax distortions, we use the cost of
capital or marginal effective tax rate in this paper. First, we assume
certain conditions about the future enviroument for marginal investments
currently under consideration. In particular, we assume that all
investments will earn a risk-free nominal after-tax return of 8.5percent,
that inflation will run at 4 percent, and that firms facea set of tax rules
including Federal and state statutory corporate tax rates, investment tax
credit rates, depreciation allowances, and localproperty tax rates that may
vary by asset. (See King and Fullerton (1984) for derivation of these
parameters under prior law.) Second, we assume that firms will undertake
all investments for which the present value of all netreturns exceeds the
outlay for the asset. They stop investing when the present value of net
returns just equals the outlay. Third, this equality can be used to solve
for the real pretax return on the marginal investment thatjust allows the
firm to earn the assumed 8.5 percent net return (4.5percent after
inflation). The equation is shown in the Appendix. This requiredpretax
return is the "cost of capital" net of depreciation, because it includestax
costs and financing costs (the required net return). Finally, themarginal
effective tax rate is the difference between this realpretax return and the
4.5 percent real posttax return, as a fraction of the realpretax return.-16-
Only the cost of capital is used in subsequent calculations, and it
does not depend upon actual choices for financing the marginal investment.
With arbitrage by the firm among various real and financial assets in this
risk-free world, all assets would have to earn the same net return. For
example, arbitrage between debt and real capital assures that any asset must
earn the after-tax interest rate. All investments thus have the same
assumed 4.5 percent real cost of funds, regardless of actual financing.5
The effective tax rate, calculated only to help interpretations, is the
fraction of the cost of capital that would be attributable to business taxes
if the investment were financed by equity.
An advantage of this approach is that we do not have to deal with
personal tax changes. Although increases in personal exemptions and
reductions in personal rates were crucial components of tax reform, they do
not relate in this model to the firm's choice among capital assets.
Similarly, we abstract from other detailed aspects of tax law that are not
directly related to this allocation decision, including passive loss rules,
minimum tax, accounting provisions,6 at-risk rules, bad-debt reserves,
51n a different model, it is possible that financing proportions could
affect the cost of capital. Bosworth (1985) and others have pointed out
that structures might use relatively more debt finance and take greater
advantage of interest deductions. Also, churning might have provided
greater tax advantages to real estate, as discussed in Gordon, Hines, and
Summers (1987). Other problems are discussed in Summers (1987).
6Fullerton, Gillette, and Mackie (1987) consider accounting rule changes and
argue that (a) much of the revenue is from existing investment and does not
apply to new investment, (b) some of the changes are best modelled as
redced output subsidies rather than reduced investment incentives, and (c)
remaining changes have a small effect on marginal effective tax rates.-17-
foreign tax provisions, and loss carryforwards.7 To simplify further, we do
not model the intricate R&Dcredit.8The model captures the important
conceptual distinction that advertising and R&D are capital assets
substantially favored under both old and new laws. These investments are
still expensed, while other assets lose their investment tax credits or
accelerated depreciation allowances.
The effective tax rate includes all business level taxes on the
corporation. It would just equal the statutory rate (34 percent under
present law) if there were no state taxes or property taxes and if cost
recovery were based on economic depreciation at replacement cost. State and
local taxes raise the effective rate, while the investment tax credit (a
maximum 10 percent under prior law) and accelerated depreciation allowances
lower it. With no local property tax on intangible capital, the effective
rate is zero because an immediate deduction for the initial outlay is
equivalent in present value to exempting the entire income stream. For
other assets, we summarize complicated depreciation allowances in a single
parameter for the exponential rate of tax depreciation. We report for all
equipment and for all structures the annual rate of depreciation on
7Any of these aspectsmay have some effect on our results. For example,
Hulten and Robertson (1984) point out that start-up firms may invest
relatively heavily in advertising or R&D but may be least able to expense
these investments. Early losses mean that deductions must be carried
forward and might be lost altogether.
8lncentive effects of the incremental R&D creditcan be small, or even
negative, depending on the circumstances of the firm. See Eisner, Albert,
and Sullivan (1984). Details of the effects of tax reform on R&D are
provided in Cordes, Watson, and Hauger (1987).-18-
historical cost that would provide the same present value of allowances as
the actual law.9
These tax parameters for present law, as provided by the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 (TRA), are shown in Table 3 for our six assets. The exponential
rate of economic depreciation for equipment is .13, derived by averaging
over estimates in Hulten and Wykoff (1981) for twenty kinds of equipment.
Comparison with the .38 exponential rate for tax depreciation indicates the
degree of acceleration for equipment, but inflation erodes the real value of
these allowances since they are based on historical cost. For structures,
the average exponential rate of economic depreciation is .03, and the rate
for tax depreciation on historical cost is .076. Inventories and land
effectively receive economic depreciation allowances, since they do not
depreciate and do not get deductions. Effective tax rates for these two
assets would match the .383 combined Federal and state statutory rate,
except that local property taxes push them up to 44 and 47 percent,
respectively. The effective rate for structures is 44 percent. The
effective tax rate for equipment is 38 percent, which indicates that tax
depreciation is a little more generous than: economic depreciation at an
inflation rate of 4 percent.
9Fullerton and Henderson (1986) providepresent value calculations for
depreciation under the old law where many diverse types of equipment receive
150 percent of declining balance, and structures receive 175 percent of
declining balance, both switching to straight line. They set a lifetime for
each asset, incorporate the half-year convention, and adjust the basis for
half the investment tax credit. Similar calculations apply to the new law
with double declining balance for equipment of different lives, and straight
line for nonresidential structures with a 31.5 year life.-19-
These differences are all reflected in the cost of capital in column
(4) of Table 3. The cost of capital under TRAforequipment is 7.3 percent
and the cost of capital for other tangible assets is between 8.1 percent and
8.4 percent. Intangible assets have a significantly lower cost of capital,
at 4.5 percent.
Because the pretax return on tangible assets is higher than that on
intangible assets, total output could be increased by shifting capital out
of intangible assets and into tangible assets. For example, replacement of
one dollar of intangible capital by one dollar of structures would increase
output by 3.6 cents, the difference in their pretax returns (8.1 minus 4.5).
To analyze more than marginal changes in the allocation of capital we need
to know the marginal product schedule of each type of capital. We assume
that asset demands are Cobb-Douglas: a one percent increase in the cost of
capital will reduce asset demand by one percent.1° Since we assume that
firms demand capital as long as the marginal product exceeds its cost, this
assumption effectively provides all marginal product schedules as well. We
use these marginal product schedules to show how much more output would be
produced by shifting capital toward the locations with a high cost of
capital (and high marginal product) and away from locations with a low cost
of capital (and low marginal product). That is, we calculate the additional
real value of output that could be produced with a given total stock of
10The loss inproduction efficiency is dependent on the responsiveness of
investment demand to the change in the pretax return of each type of asset.
The greater the responsiveness of demand to changes in this rate of return,
the greater is the efficiency cost of tax distortions. Fullerton and
Henderson (1986) provide some evidence on the sensitivity of the efficiency
cost to this parameter.-20-
capital, if it were simply reallocated to more productive locations and used
more efficiently.
These calculations are similar to those of Gravelle (1982) and Auerbach
(1983) for different types of equipment and structures under the old law.
They represent interasset distortions only and do not include additional
misallocations between the corporate sector and noncorporate sector or
distortions of saving decisions, risk-bearing, financial choices, housing,
and labor markets.11 Fullerton, Lyon, and Rosen (1984) perform similar
calculations including equipment, structures, inventories, and land.
Fullerton and Henderson (1986) include intersectoral distortions and
housing, but none of these studies considers intangible assets. In the
previous section we calculated large amounts of intangible capital, and in
the next section we calculate revised costs of interasset distortions.
4. Welfare Results under Alternative Tax Regimes
The cost of capital for different assets under the Tax Reform Act are
first compared with prior law and a modification of prior law that merely
repeals the investment tax credit (Repeal ITC). Under prior law, firms
faced a combined Federal and state statutory corporate tax rate of .495 and
were eligible for an investment tax credit of 10 percent on most equipment
and certain structures (as classified in the National Income and Product
Accounts). Tax depreciation for equipment is represented by an exponential
11These calculations also assume that allcorporate assets are separable in
production. Feldstein (1985) and others have pointed out that particular
substitutability relationships among assets could make nonuniform taxation
more efficient.-21-
rate of .34, a figure which is less generous than the .38 rate under TRA
because the basis is reduced by half the investment tax credit. The present
value of depreciation allowances for equipment at an 8.5 percent nominal
after-tax discount rate under prior law is 2 percent less than under TRA,
indicating that in the absence of the half-basis adjustment of prior law (a
5 percent reduction in the value of depreciation allowances), depreciation
allowances would have been more accelerated under prior law than under TRA.
Tax depreciation of structures is represented by an exponential rate of
.135, providing depreciation allowances that are 30 percent greater in
present value than under TRA. Other tax parameters are the same as in Table
3. Repeal of the credit is modeled identically to prior law, except the
investment tax credit rate is zero for all assets.
The cost of capital for each type of capital under each of the three
tax regimes is shown in Table 4,12 Because of the investment tax credit,
the cost of capital is lower under prior law than under TRA for equipment,
while because of the higher statutory tax rate, the cost of capital is
higher under prior law for structures, inventories, and land. Because of
expensing, however, the cost of capital always equals the real net return
for intangible assets. Repeal of the investment tax credit raises the cost
of capital for equipment by two-thirds but leaves other assets unaffected.
Average measures of the cost of capital also are shown in Table 4 for
all tangible capital and for all capital, including advertising and R&D
'2Not shown separtely in thetable, but included in the overall averages,
is the cost of capital under prior lawfor structures eligible for the
investment tax credit. This cost of capital is estimated to be 6.98
percent.-22-
intangible capital. Under TRA and "Repeal ITC", all tangible assets have
similar costs of capital, indicating that there is likely to be little loss
in productive efficiency due to misallocation of capital across the
different types of tangible capital. Major differences in the cost of
capital between tangible and intangible capital in all three tax regimes,
however, may be a significant source of production inefficiency.
4.1 The Inclusion of Intangible Capital
Previous studies have calculated the cost of the loss in production
efficiency of differential taxation among tangible assets. Because we wish
to show how this welfare loss changes with the introduction of intangible
capital, we first calculate the welfare loss for the three tax regimes
assuming no intangible capital.
Our findings under the assumption of no intangible capital are similar
to those of previous research. Under prior law, the annual welfare loss
from differential taxation is $9.8 billion per year. This cost is 13
percent of corporate tax revenue in 1983, or .3 percent of GNP. With repeal
of the investment tax credit, distortions among tangible assets are greatly
reduced, and the welfare loss falls to $0.7 billion. The Tax Reform Act of
1986, by reducing the statutory corporate tax rate, provides some further
reduction in interasset distortions, and the welfare loss falls to $0.4
billion. In the absence of intangible capital, TRA or repeal of the credit
appears quite successful in creating a level playing field.
Next, we repeat these calculations for the three tax regimes using our
central estimate of the intangible capital stock attributable to advertising-23-
and R&D. Under all three tax regimes, the addition of these untaxed assets
increases the interasset distortions and the welfare loss measures. (The
addition of any capital with a cost of capital different from the average
will increase our measure of the welfare loss.) The cost of interasset
distortions under prior law increases to $12.8 billion; under repeal of the
ITC it increases to $6.7 billion; and under TRA itincreasesto $4.1
billion. These welfare losses are compared in Table 5 with the previous
estimates under the assumption of no intangible capital.
An important result is that the consideration of intangible capital
does not increase the welfare loss by the same amount in each tax regime.
Comparing the welfare losses across tax regimes, we find that the absolute
welfare gain from repeal of the credit is reduced by one-third when we
include intangible capital, from $9.1 billion ($9.8 billion minus $0.7
billion with no intangible capital) to $6.1 billion ($12.8 billion minus
$6.7 million with intangible capital). The investment tax credit can be
viewed as less distorting in the presence of intangible capital, because the
average cost of capital for all assets is lower.
Under the Tax Reform Act, the inclusion of advertising and R&D
intangible capital reduces the absolute welfare improvement over prior law
only slightly, from $9.5 billion ($9.8 billion minus $0.4 billion) to $8.7
billion ($l2.8 billion minus $4.1 billion). As under repeal of the ITC,
intangible capital adds more of a distortion under TRA than under prior law,
but the reduction in the statutory corporate tax rate mitigates this effect.
The statutory rate reduction lowers the cost of capital for allpositively
taxed assets, while the cost of capital remains unchanged for intangible-24-
capital with a zero effective tax rate. Therefore, TRA still provides
significant efficiency gains relative to prior law.
As mentioned in Section 2, changes in assumed rates of depreciation for
advertising and R&D could nearly double or reduce by one-half our measure of
the stock of these assets. More importantly, this study omits many other
forms of intangible capital. Because the actual level of intangible capital
may be much greater than we have measured here, we also calculate the
welfare loss under the three tax regimes for variations in the level of
intangible capital between zero and 12 times our measured intangible capital
stock. Our results show that inclusion of greater amounts of intangible
capital increases the welfare loss from distortionary taxation under each
tax regime. Under prior law, if the actual intangible capital stock is four
times larger than our measured intangible capital stock, the welfare loss is
nearly double the measure in studies that omit intangible capital ($19.2
billion). Figure 1 shows how increases in the level of intangible capital
increase the welfare loss measure under each tax regime.
Further, we find that if the actual level of intangible capital is
between four and five times our measured level, repeal of the investment tax
credit results in a loss of welfare. For these magnitudes of intangible
capital, the average cost of capital is low enough that repeal raises the
cost of equipment away from the average instead of toward the average.
Repeal of the credit in combination with the corporate rate reduction
of TRA, however, results in efficiency gains relative to prior law for all
levels of intangible capital modeled. The absolute improvement in
productive efficiency declines from $8.7 billion at our measured level of-25-
advertising and R&Dintangiblecapital to $5.6 billion when intangible
capital is assumed to be 12 times our measured level.
4.2 Further Sensitivity Analysis
The favorable tax treatment for R&D is often justified as a proper
correction for postive externalities generated by R&D. In this view, firms
are unable to appropriate all of the returns from the research they
undertake. Competitors or the world at large may benefit from the R&D
performed by a firm. Part or all of this effect might be offset by the fact
that we ignore the incremental R&D credit. Under TRA, firms can receive a
20 percent credit for qualifying R&D expenditures exceeding a base period
amount. Because R&D expenditures increase the base for calculating future
credits, however, the marginal incentive of this credit is very difficult to
model. We abstract from it here, but this omission is equivalent to the
assumption that the marginal incentive of the R&D credit exactly offsets any
positive externalities from R&D.
Suppose, however, that these spillover benefits are even greater than
the marginal incentive of the R&Dcredit.To be specific, assume the
marginal return to society from R&D is 50 percent greater than the private
after-tax return of 4.50 percent, i.e., 6.75 percent. For all other assets
we continue to assume no externalities. Under this assumption, the pretax
return to R&D including the externality is closer to that of all tangible
capital, causing welfare losses to be lower than showninTable 5 or Figure
1. At our measured level of intangible capital, the welfare loss under TRA
andprior law is about $2.0 billion lower than in Table 5, and under repeal-26-
of the ITC it is $3.0 billion lower than in Table 5. The absolute welfare
gain of TRA relative to prior law is therefore the same as shown in Table 5,
while it is slightly greater for repeal of ITC relative to prior law. At
higher assumed levels of intangible capital (but holding the level of R&D
fixed), the welfare losses are only slightly lower than those shown in
Figure 1.
Next, we consider a modification to the tax treatment of advertising
expenditures. One proposal considered during tax reform and again during
this year's budget reconciliation is a partial disallowance of the deduction
for advertising expenditures. Here, we consider a modification of TRA that
provides a deduction for only 80 percent of advertising expenditures. This
disallowance is equivalent in present value to capitalizing all advertising
expenditures and allowing them to be depreciated at a 34 percent exponential
rate, comparable to that for equipment under TRA. To calculate the new cost
of capital for advertising, we assume advertising capital has an economic
exponential depreciation rate of 33 percent. The partial disallowance of
advertising expenditures results in a cost of capital of 9.2 percent, or an
effective tax rate of 51 percent. This tax cost is higher than that of
other assets because the 80 percent deduction (or equivalently 34 percent
rate of depreciation on historical cost) is not enough to cover economic
depreciation at 4 percent inflation.
At our measured level of intangible capital (and assuming no
externalities for R&D), welfare losses under TRA with a partial deduction
for advertising decrease from $4.1 billion to $3.0 billion. At greater-27-
levels of intangible capital (while holding constant the level of
advertising capital), these welfare gains are snialler.13
Finally, some believe that advertising may generate negative
externalities, that is, yield a social rate of return below its private rate
of return. Some advertising may simply redistribute sales between competing
brands but provide no net increase in total sales. Under the assumption
that advertising generates negative externalities, welfare losses under all
three tax regimes would be greater. A tax on advertising would raise the
social rate of return on advertising toward that of other assets, and result
in welfare gains.
5. Conclusion
Intangible capital has escaped the attention of many tax researchers
and tax policymakers. As a consequence, discussions of a "level playing
field" have concentrated on the relative taxation of equipment, structures,
and other tangible assets. They have ignored the significant tax advantages
of expensing investments in advertising, R&D, and other intangible assets.
We show in this paper that the consideration of intangible capital renders
invalid many of the standard views about what constitutes an efficiency
increasing reform. For sufficiently large levels of intangible capital,
13
In fact, ifthetotal stock of intangible capital is at least eight times
greater than our measured stock of advertising and R&D intangible capital,
the partial deduction for advertising actually decreases welfare. This
result occurs because the cost of capital for advertising is greater than
the cost of capital for all other assets. With sufficiently large amounts
of untaxed intangible capital, it is more distorting to tax advertising at
greater than average rates than to leave it untaxed. At any level of
intangible capital, however, a less restrictive partial deduction for
advertising would always generate efficiency gains.-28-
repeal of the investment tax credit can actually increase the cost of
distorting firms' choices among assets. Importantly, however, we find that
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 still reduces the cost of these distortions
relative to prior law.
The point of this paper is not to provide refined estimates of the
welfare costs of taxes on income from capital. Indeed, other studies
calculate detailed effects of specific tax provisions on distortions among
assets, between the corporate and noncorporate sectors, between business
capital and housing, among sources of finance, or between present and future
consumption. They might use more sophisticated formulas that account for
estimated asset demands or particular relationships among assets in
production. Other studies do not consider intangible capital, however.
This paper uses very simple calculations to show that this omission has a
major effect on measures of distortions among assets that were a major
concern in discussions of tax reform.
These results do not imply that concerns about the level playing field
were misplaced, however. Perhaps they were only too limited by considering
only tangible capital. The model in this paper starts with the presumption
that corporate capital is allocated most efficiently when all types of
capital have the same pretax return (or, in the presence of externalities,
the same social return). With unequal effective tax rates, efficiency can
be increased by any reform that raises the lowest effective rates and uses
the revenue to reduce the highest effective rates. Repeal of the investment
tax credit may have raised the low effective tax rate for equipment and
provided revenue for rate reduction, but it did not deal with the asset-29-
having the lowest effective tax rate. Further efficiency gains are possible
in this model. If advertising and R&D do create assets that depreciate over
time, then expensing provides a zero effective tax rate for that asset. Any
cut-back from expensing, such as a partial disallowance or delay in
deductions, would raise the lowest effective tax rate, remove further
distortions, and provide revenue that could be used to reduce or maintain
lower rates.Technical Appendix
In the framework of Hall and Jorgenson (1967), we consider a corporation
facing a certain nominal after-tax discount rate r and inflation rate ir.The
firm makes a one-dollar marginal investment in asset j that depreciates
exponentially at rate 6. and earns a net marginal product
p.
Income from the
asset is taxed at the statutory corporate rate u. The firm receives an
immediate investment tax credit at rate k. and delayed depreciation allowances
on the original purchase price. The present value of these allowances per
dollar of investment is z. where the firm discounts future nominal allowances
J
by the nominal after-tax discount rate. For further discussion of these
assumptions, see Bradford and Fullerton (1981).
The profit-maximizing firm continues to make such investments until, in
competitive equilibrium, the cost of the asset is just equal to the present
discounted value of after-tax returns and tax savings from the asset. This
equilibrium condition is used to solve for the net marginal product or pretax
return p, as a function of other parameters:
r —ir+S.
p. (1 —k.—uz.)—6.. (1) 1—u j j
Thiscost is gross of taxes but net of depreciation. This pretax return can
easily vary among assets with different credit rates depreciation rates
and/or a1loqances z.. With no investment tax credit, however, depreciation
could be set so that the firm receives economic allowances at replacement cost
for every asset. The firm then discounts by the real net return s =r—it.In
this case, z. equals S./(s +S.),and p. reduces to s/(1 —u)for all assets.
Alternatively, equation (1) shows that expensing all assets (k =0andz =1)provides p. equal to s for all assets. If the total corporate capital stock is
fixed, the tax system does not distort its allocation in either of these two
special cases. Other tax rules also can provide the same p for all assets, as
shown in Bradford (1980) and Brown (1981).
In general, taxes do distort the allocation of capital among assets. In
this paper, we follow Hendershott and Hu (1980) and Gravelle (1982) in
measuring the associated welfare cost by a more recent version of the formula
used by Harberger (1966):






where K' is the stock of asset j in the distorted equilibrium, k. is the stock
in the undistorted equilibrium, p(K.) is the net marginal product given the
level K., p is the cost of capital in the undistorted equilibrium, and N is the
number of assets. To measure W therefore we need to know how the use of K.
3
depends upon its cost p. Econometric studies reviewed in Jorgenson (1974)
suggest that firms' total use of capital changes by approximately one percent
for each one percent change in its cost. This cost could conceivably begross
or net of depreciation, and gross costs are often used in empirical work
finding that gross output is a Cobb-Douglas function of capital and labor.
However, the use of net costs p. in equation (2) guarantees a fixed total stock
of capital under all reallocations. No empirical work has measured price
elasticities separately for each of the capital assets used in this study, but
we assume that the demand for each K. has unitary elasticity with respect to
its pricep.Expenditure on each type of capital is a constant under our assumptions,
soK. =p'Kfor any K. Thus, we can substitute PJKJ/Kj for(I(s) in




For the distorted equilibrium under old law, capital costs are given by
equation (1) using parameters for old law derived in King and Fullerton (1984).
We obtain the distorted capital allocation K for 1983 from data in Jorgenson &
Sullivan (1981), more recent issues of the Survey of Current Business, the
Federal Reserve Board's Balance Sheets for the U.S. Economy, and our
constructed stocks of intangible capital. We estimate the long-run distorted
allocation for the other tax plans using the same Cobb-Douglas reactions to
changes in the cost of capital. Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA), for
example, K is given by capital expenditures (K.p.) under 1983 law divided by
the cost of capital (pr) under TRA.
For the undistorted or counterfactual equilibrium, capital costs should be
the sani'e for all assets. Our particular choice for p is the capital-weighted
average of from the distorted equilibrium, such that both equilibria have
the same aggregate pretax return, the same aggregate after-tax return, and the
same total tax revenue.
Once we specify r, it,andtax parameters for each law, equations (1) and
(3) together provide the cost of capital for each asset and the efficiency cost

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Tax Parameters and the Cost of Capital under 1986 Law for Each Asset
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ExponentialExponential
Economic Rate PropertyCost RealEffective
Depreciation for Tax Tax of Net Tax Rate
Asset Rate Depreciation Rate Capital Return (4-5)/(4)
Equipment .130 .380 .008 .073 .045 .380
Structures .030 .Q76 .011 .081 .045 .443
Inventories .000 .000 .008 .081 .045 .442
Land .000 .000 .011 .084 .045 .466
Advertising .333 .000 .045 .045 .000
R&D Capital .150 .000 .045 .045 .000
Note: The cost of capital is defined here to be gross of tax but net of
depreciation. It is based on equation (1) of the Appendix, using a corporate
rate of .383 including state corporate taxes, a discount rate of .085, an
inflation rate of .04, and therefore a real net return of .045 as shown in the
table.Table 4
The Cost of Capital under Alternative Tax Regimes (percent)
(1) (2) (3)
Asset Prior Law Repeal ITC Tax Reform Act
Equipment 5.23 8.70 7.25
Structures 8.47 8.47 8.08
Inventories 9.68 9.68 8.06
Land 10.04 10.04 8.42
Average for All
Tangible Assets 7.52 9.09 7.92
Advertising 4.50 4.50 4.50
R&D Capital 4.50 4.50 4.50
Average for All Capital 7.19 8.49 7.53Table 5
The Efficiency Cost of Interasset Distortions
under Alternative Tax Regimes
No With Advertising and
Intangible R&D Intangible
Capital Capital
Billions of Percent Billions of Percent
1983 Dollars of GNP 1983 Dollarsof GNP
Prior Law 9.8 .29 12.8 .38
Repeal ITC 0.7 .02 6.7 .20
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